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Rethinking Subsidiarity in International
Human Rights Adjudication
William M Carter,Jr.*

I.

Introduction

The principle of subsidiarity has been one of the
foundational organizing elements of the international human rights
system since its inception. In its simplest form, the principle of
subsidiarity holds that international human rights standards are best
implemented at the lowest level of government that can effectuate
those standards.' Thus, before a supranational or multinational
body renders a decision on a matter of international human rights,
it must first be assured that the domestic government at issue has
been given an opportunity to remedy the situation. Moreover, even
once a human rights matter has been considered or adjudicated by
the supranational body, the principle of subsidiarity is thought to
measures is best
generally require that the decision
2 as to remedial
left to the domestic government.
The principle of subsidiarity arises out of both pragmatic
Pragmatically, the principle of
and normative concerns.
subsidiarity recognizes that international bodies concerned with
human rights cannot compel compliance with their decisions.
Ultimately, enforcement of international human rights law depends
on voluntary compliance by domestic governments and the use of
those domestic governments' police powers to enforce international
human rights law, since the international system lacks such
* William M. Carter Jr. is a Professor of Law at the Temple University Beasley
School of Law. The author acknowledges The Hon. Clifford Scott Green
Research Fund in Law for its generous support. The author also thanks Amanda
Hitchell, Joni Tarchichi, and Shwetha Srinivasan for their research assistance.
1 See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 338

(1994).
2

1d. at 452.
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powers. 3 Moreover, it is generally believed that since domestic
authorities have greater expertise regarding the situations in their
own countries than do international functionaries, the domestic
authorities are better positioned to reach the "best" result with
regard to the content and implementation of international human
rights within their own countries.4
As a normative matter, the principle of subsidiarity reflects
respect for national sovereignty by recognizing that, despite the
purported universality of international human rights law, each
nation retains ultimate sovereignty over matters occurring within
its own territory. Additionally, the principle of subsidiarity is
thought to promote democratic governance and transparency
because domestic authorities, unlike international bodies, are
presumed to be directly accountable to the citizenry of their
country. 5 When citizens disagree with the content given to
international human rights law, they presumably are better able to
influence the development of that body of law if its definition and
enforcement rest primarily in the hands of representatives who are
accountable to the people.6
This article suggests that a re-evaluation of the principle of
subsidiarity is in order. While I make no sweeping claims that the
3

While Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter does provide for a variety of
coercive measures to maintain international peace and security, those measures
are highly unlikely to be invoked except in the gravest of cases. See U.N.
Charter, Chapter VII, Art. 41 and 42 (authorizing the Security Council to
enforce its decisions by the use of armed force or other coercive measures, but
only to maintain international peace and security).

4 See, e.g., Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: the United States and
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in THE SWORD AND THE SCALES: THE UNITED
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 80, note 230

(Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2008) (stating that international bodies
give governments a "margin of appreciation" or substantial discretion in
resolving human rights matters, "given local actors' greater appreciation of the
facts on the ground" and the need to "take[] account of domestic conflicting
duties, burdens, and resource constraints.").
5 See Bermann supra note 1, at 340.
6 See Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The
Future of InternationalDecision-Making, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 9 (2003).
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principle of subsidiarity is always preferable or always
undesirable, I do suggest that a close look at the myriad ways in
which subsidiarity applies reveals that it may sometimes impede,
rather than advance, the cause it purports to serve: namely,
achieving universality of human rights. This article identifies
situations where subsidiarity is more likely to diminish human
rights protections that it is to advance them and suggests that
subsidiarity should be abandoned or minimized in such areas.
Part II of this article reviews the history of the principle of
subsidiarity, surveys the areas of international human rights law in
which the principle is applied, and focuses on those situations
where uncritical acceptance of subsidiarity may lead to results that
undermine the universality of international human rights. Part III
concludes by suggesting that a preference for supranational
adjudication would be beneficial with regard to the content of
international human rights law and remedies for violations of
human rights.
II.

Background of Subsidiarity and Current Application to
International Human Rights
A.

The Origins of Subsidiarity

The principle of subsidiarity is generally traced to the
Catholic Church in the late nineteenth century, although the
concept's roots predate the Church's articulation thereof. The
Church argued that it was "an injustice, a grave evil and a
disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to
arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by
smaller and lower bodies." 8 As European nations began to
7 See Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principleof International

Human Rights Law, 97

AM. J. OF INT'L L. 38, 40 (2003) ("Even though the word
'subsidiarity' entered our political lexicon only in the twentieth century, the idea
has an intellectual history as old as European political thought.").
8 Quadragesimo Anno, Encyclical of Pope Pius May 15, 1931,
79 (St. Paul
ed.,
Boston),
available
at
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integrate socially and economically, culminating in the formation
of multinational organizations, such as the European Union, they
incorporated the principle of subsidiarity into the newly formed
organizations. For example, Article 3b of the Rome Treaty
establishing the European Community provides:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Community shall take action in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if
and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by
the Community.
The view of the relationship between supranational and national
governance as expressed in the principle of subsidiarity therefore
recognizes that a supranational organization may have been
delegated areas of "exclusive competence," but that, outside of
such expressly delegated areas, a presumption exists in favor of
national authority versus supranational authority.
The principle of subsidiarity has spread beyond its
European Community roots and is incorporated into the law and
practices of various organizations concerned with international
human rights. 9 It has only occasionally been explicitly invoked in
treaties concerning human rights;' 0 most often, the principle of
subsidiarity finds expression implicitly in the practices and
doctrines of supranational human rights bodies.

http://www.vatican.va/lholyfather/pius-xi/encyclicals/documents/hf

-

xi enc 19310515_quadragesimo-annoen.html.
9See Carozza, supra note 7, at 38-39.
10See id. at 39 (noting that Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union states that it is "addressed to the institutions and bodies of
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity.").
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Practice in Human Rights

Treaty bodies concerned with international human rights
have attempted to reconcile the goal of universality of human
rights with respect for national sovereignty in a variety of ways.
These can be broadly characterized as falling into the following
areas: (1) the content of international human rights (the "content
stage"); (2) access to supranational adjudicatory bodies (the
"jurisdictional stage"); and (3) remedial measures (the
"enforcement stage"). The principle of subsidiarity is applied in all
these stages. After providing examples of subsidiarity in operation
in all three stages, this Article suggests that there are cogent
reasons for subsidiarity in the jurisdictional stage, but that
uncritical deference to national authorities in the content and
enforcement stages undermines the goals of international human
rights law.
The content of international human rights law is determined
both by positive lawmaking and by common law interpretation.
The positivist content of international human rights is that written
in the text of human rights treaties and declarations such as the
("Universal
Rights
of Human
Declaration
Universal
Declaration"),11 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR"), 12 the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("Race
Convention"), 13 etc. All reference respect for national sovereignty
in various provisions relating to the content definition,
jurisdictional, or enforcement stages. Examples from the above
listed treaties include:

G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12,
1948).
12 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), (Dec. 16, 1966).
13660 U.N.T.S. 195 (1966).
'1

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 30:

(1) Article 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration provides an
example of subsidiarity in the content stage, by providing that
domestic governments may limit rights when they determine doing
so is necessary to meet "the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society."
(2) ICCPR Article 41 (1)(c) is an example of subsidiarity in
the jurisdictional stage. Article 41 described the procedures of the
Human Rights Committee, which monitors compliance with the
ICCPR. Article 41(1)(c) provides that the Committee "shall deal
with a matter referred to it only after it has ascertained that 1all
4
available domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted.'
(3) The Race Convention provides an example of
subsidiarity in the remedy stage. Articles 8-14 describe the
procedures of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination ("CERD"), the treaty body established to enforce
the Race Convention. CERD's powers and procedures evidence
subsidiarity in the enforcement stage. In contrast to the Universal
Declaration (which, because it is a declaration rather than a treaty,
lacks an enforcement body altogether) and the Human Rights
Committee (which was not established as an adjudicatory body per
se), 15 CERD has significantly greater enforcement powers. In
addition to its monitoring function, which is fulfilled through its
receipt and consideration of member states' (or "States Parties")
periodic reports on their progress in achieving compliance with the
Race Convention,' 6 CERD is also empowered to adjudicate
complaints from member states17 as well as to accept individual
petitions alleging violations of the Race Convention.' 8 Upon
However, that same Article also provides an exception where the domestic
procedures are "unreasonably prolonged." Id.
14

15

LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 499 (Foundation Press 1999)

("Although the [Human Rights] Committee acts in a quasi-judicial fashion when
it considers individual communications, the Optional Protocol [to the ICCPR]
does not explicitly vest the Committee with the power to render legally binding
decisions."). Id.
16 Race Convention, Art.
9.
17Id.
Art. 11.
8

' Id. Art. 14.
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finding a violation of the Race Convention, however, CERD's
remedial powers are limited in a way that demonstrates that the
preferred enforcement body is the domestic government alleged to
have violated the treaty. In the case of complaints by a State Party,
CERD's goal is to reach an "amicable solution,"' 9 rather than, for
example, to issue a "judgment." If such a solution cannot be
reached by negotiation between the States Parties, CERD is to
prepare a report on the dispute and to make such recommendations
"as it may think proper for the amicable solution of the dispute. '20
The States Parties, however, may reject these recommendations,
and the Race Convention provides CERD with no explicit
enforcement mechanism if a State Party does so. 2 1 With regard to
individual petitions, subsidiarity is evidenced by the confidentiality
of the procedures and, as with inter-state complaints, the fact that
CERD's enforcement powers are limited to making "suggestions
22
and recommendations" to the complained-of State Party.
The common law interpretation of international human
rights treaties also incorporates subsidiarity in the content,
jurisdictional, and enforcement stages. The European Court of
Human Rights' ("ECHR") doctrine of the "margin of appreciation"
is perhaps the most striking example of subsidiarity in the content
stage. The margin of appreciation is essentially a doctrine of
deference to domestic authorities. It is "based on the notion that
each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving the inherent
conflicts between individual 23
rights and national interests or among
different moral convictions."
Buckley v. United Kingdom24 provides an extreme example
of the margin of appreciation leading to near total deference to
national authorities. In Buckley, a British citizen of Roma or
'9 Id.Art. 12(1)(a)
201d.Art. 13(1).
21 Id. Art. 13.
22
1d. Art. 14.

Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal
Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 843 (1999).
24 23 Eur. Ct. H. R. 101 (1996).
23
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"gypsy" background applied for governmental permission to live in
a traditional Roma caravan style on land she owned. The
government denied the request on the grounds that the local area
had already "reached 'saturation point' for Gypsy accommodation"
and that the petitioner's planned use of her land "would detract
from the rural and open quality of the landscape." When her
request was denied, she filed a petition with the ECHR alleging
various violations of the European Convention, primarily relying
upon Article 8. That Article provides that the States Parties shall
not infringe the right to respect private and family life and the
home. Article 8(2), however, provides that the government may
infringe this right when doing so is "necessary in a democratic
society" in the pursuit of certain articulated aims, including public
safety and economic well being, and the rights and freedoms of
others.
The ECHR, applying the margin of appreciation, found that
the government's actions did not violate the European Convention.
Under the margin of appreciation, "it is for the national authorities
to make the initial assessment of the 'necessity' for an interference
[with human rights]." 25 The ECHR also noted, however, that while
the national authorities have great discretion under the margin of
appreciation, their decisions are ultimately subject to review by the
ECHR. The ECHR also noted that the scope of the discretion
accorded to national authorities will vary depending on the facts of
each case. Applying the margin of appreciation in Buckley, the
ECHR found that the judgment of local planning authorities in
denying petitioner's application to live in a traditional Roma
caravan on her land was within the discretion of national
authorities to determine when a limitation on international human
rights is "necessary."
The margin of appreciation, as illustrated by Buckley,
shows supranational bodies' willingness to delegate the initial
definition of the content of international human rights to national
authorities. In according deference to the national government's
25

1d. at 102.

1]
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assessment of the necessity for restricting an international human
right, the margin of appreciation essentially allows the national
government to define the content of that right.
Supranational bodies' interpretations of the requirement of
exhaustion of domestic remedies also evidence subsidiarity.
International adjudicatory bodies limit access to the international
system by requiring that the petitioner must have tried to invoke
any available domestic remedies. In so doing, however, these
bodies have developed a series of exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement and, as such, generally place lesser emphasis on
subsidiarity in the jurisdictional stage than one might expect given
the language of the relevant treaties. A prominent example is
Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras.26 In that case, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights considered a petition on behalf
of a person who had allegedly been subject to extra-judicial
detention and disappearance. The Court began by considering
whether the petitioner had, as required by the American
Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention"), 27
exhausted his domestic remedies before proceeding to the
international tribunal. While Honduras had laws providing habeas
corpus proceedings to challenge an unlawful detention, the Court
held that the ineffectiveness of the habeas procedure meant that the
habeas procedure need not have been fully exhausted in order for
the petition to be admissible.
The American Convention provides that the exhaustion
requirement is not applicable when (a) domestic legislation does
not provide due process of law for the protection of the rights
allegedly violated, (b) the party alleging violation of his rights has
been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been
prevented from exhausting them or (c) there has been unwarranted
26

Velasquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29,

1988), reprinted at 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989).
American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144

27

U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82
doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992).
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28
delay in rendering a final judgment under the domestic remedies.
The Court went beyond these textual exceptions, however, and
ruled that the exhaustion requirement may be excused whenever
the petitioner can prove, on the facts of his case, that the available
29
domestic remedies are unlikely to be adequate or effective.
While the mere fact that available domestic remedies have not led
to the result the petitioner wants is not in itself an excuse for
failing to exhaust them, the Court emphasized that it will not
require exhaustion when invoking the available domestic remedies
would be a "senseless formality." 30 The Court found that the past
practice of the Honduran government in cases of disappearances
revealed that the available domestic remedy of habeas corpus
would not be adequate or effective to remedy the violation, and
therefore excused the petitioner from needing to fully exhaust it.
International adjudicatory bodies also operate under a model
of subsidiarity with regard to enforcement of international human
rights treaties. In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals ("Avena"),31 Mexico sued the United States in the
International Court of Justice ("ICJ"). Mexico alleged that the
United States had violated the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations by Texas officials' failure to inform Mexican nationals
upon their arrest in the U.S. of their Vienna Convention rights to
consular notification and access. The ICJ ruled in favor of
Mexico, holding that the United States had indeed violated the
treaty. Having found a treaty violation, however, the ICJ did not
order a specific remedy for the breach (e.g., that the resulting
convictions and sentencing were void and that the prisoners be
released). Rather, the ICJ held that the U.S. was required to
provide review and reconsideration of the cases in order to
determine whether the treaty violations had materially affected

28
Id.at
29

Article 46(2).
Velasquez-Rodriguez, 28 I.L.M. at 305-07.
30
Id.at 306.
31 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31).
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those cases and, if so,32 what further steps might be necessary to
remedy the violations.
III.

Resolving the Tension
Human Rights

Between

Subsidiarity

and

In order to evaluate the desirability of the principle of
subsidiarity in the content, jurisdictional, and enforcement stages
of human rights adjudication, it is first necessary to consider
briefly the goals of the modem international human rights
movement. The primary objective of the modem international
human rights movement is to protect individual human rights by
supplementing domestic rights protections. 33
Thus, the
international human rights ideal is to provide a supranational body
of rights that is not dependent on the grace of individual nations for
their enforcement and to make this body of rights universal.
Subsidiary in the jurisdictional stage of human rights
adjudication, e.g., the doctrine of exhaustion of domestic remedies,
is compatible with the goals of international human rights law. By
requiring an individual to exhaust his or her domestic remedies
before proceeding to an international body, the exhaustion
requirement ensures that the government will have the opportunity
to correct the violation on its own initiative; requires the
government to engage in a self-reflective process of examining its
own human rights record; and preserves scarce international
resources for those situations that the domestic government is
unable or unwilling to resolve on its own. Moreover, the
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement discussed in Part II.B.,
32

Id. at 60. The U.S. sought to comply with the ICJ ruling in Avena by directing

the Texas courts to provide review and reconsideration of the death sentences at
issue. The Texas courts refused and the matter was ultimately appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the treaties maKing iCi judglncim biniiig
upon the United States were non-self-executing and that the President could not
direct the Texas courts to comply with Avena. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346 (2008).
33 HENKIN ET AL., supra note 15, at 275.
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supra, are designed to ensure that governmental delay, obstruction,
or ineffectiveness under the guise of exhaustion of domestic
remedies will not be allowed to prevent the petitioner from
proceeding to an international tribunal.
Subsidiarity as to the content of international human rights,
however, undermines the goal of universality. According each
nation deference with regard to the meaning of international
human rights ultimately leads to a variety of substantive human
rights standards rather than a single universal standard. Even if an
offending nation ultimately disagrees with the content an
international body gives to an international human right and
therefore refuses to enforce it, the offending nation is still deemed
to have deviated from a common standard and must therefore
defend its actions. This Article therefore suggests that subsidiarity
should not be the rule with regard to the content of international
human rights. Rather, international bodies should define the
content of international human rights and the burden should be
placed on states to either conform their conduct to the international
standard or explicitly defend their decision not to do so.
I acknowledge that one of the benefits of subsidiarity in the
content definition stage is respect for pluralism. Subsidiarity
"rejects the notion that respect for universal human rights is
synonymous with singular or absolutist outcomes or
interpretations, which only an international body is competent to
define." 34 I suggest, however, that on balance, the benefits of a
single supranational legal standard regarding the content of
Ultimately,
international human rights outweighs its costs.
with
regard to
domestic
authorities
according substantial latitude to
the content of international human rights risks the perception that
international human rights law is less a body of law than a series of
fluid standards subject to negotiation and renegotiation as it suits
the needs of a given state. 35 While "respect for state sovereignty"
Melish, supra note 4, at 14.
See generally William M. Carter Jr., The Mote in thy Brother'sEye: A Review
of HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IOOLATRY by Michael Ignatieff, 20 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 496 (2002).
34
35
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may be important, it should not be seen in itself as a goal of
international human rights law nor should it be allowed
to impede
36
the goal of advancing and protecting human dignity.
A closer question is presented with regard to subsidiarity of
international institutions in the choice of remedial measures. In
contrast with the content stage -- where it must be determined what
the human right at stake is -- the enforcement stage deals with what
measures are best suited to remedy the violation of the right.
There is a reasonable argument that, at least in some
circumstances, the question of remedies is better left to local
government officials who have greater familiarity than
international tribunals with local conditions that may be relevant to
the nature of an appropriate and effective remedy.
A rough comparison in U.S. domestic law can be found in
the history school desegregation litigation. In Brown v. Board. of
Education ("Brown J),37 the Supreme Court held that racial
segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.
In Brown 1, the Court took cognizance of the "great variety of local
conditions" 38 prevailing in public school districts around the
country. In Brown 1, 3 9 the Court's subsequent opinion focusing on
remedial measures, the Court again emphasized its view that
"varied local school problems" required that "[local] [s]chool
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating,
assessing, and solving these problems .... ,40 Thus, while the
constitutional violation required implementation of a remedy "with
all deliberate speed, ' ,4 1 the specific remedy was to be devised by
36

See Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the

Universality of InternationalHuman Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527,
528 (2001) (arguing that "any assertion that . . . political entities also merit
tolerance and respect for their autonomy is necessarily derivative, not
independent, of the rationale for respecting individual autonomy.").
17 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38
1 d. at 495.
39 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40 Id. at 299.
41 Id. at 300.
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local authorities, with the federal courts serving a supervisory
function to ensure that such remedies were designed in good faith.
The post-Brown experience reveals, however, that the
Court's deference to local authorities did not produce the results for
which it hoped. Rather than devising in good faith those local
remedies best suited to local conditions, many local authorities saw
42
the Court's deference as an invitation to ignore or subvert Brown.
The Court eventually confronted this creative defiance ten years
after Brown. In Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward
County,43 the Court was faced with a school board's decision to
close all of its public schools rather than integrate them in
compliance with Brown. The Court, referring to the "all deliberate
speed" formulation it had adopted in Brown 11, held that "there has
been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed in
44
enforcing the constitutional rights we held in Brown.,
Accordingly, the Court ordered the reopening of the public schools
and held that the courts themselves should order relief that would
be "quick and effective" in integrating the nation's schools
pursuant to the Brown decisions.45
To be sure, one should not infer too much regarding
subsidiarity in international law from the example of the Brown
litigation. But it is illustrative of the dangers of relying on the
good faith of local officials to devise remedies for human rights
violations. On balance, it is better for international tribunals to
take the lead in defining remedies for violations of treaties within
their purview. To the extent that designing an effective remedy
truly requires intimate knowledge of local conditions beyond the
ready competence of international tribunals, those tribunals
presumably can be fully informed of such conditions by the
domestic government. Moreover, human rights country reports by
42

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

694-95 (Aspen Law &

Business 2d ed. 2005) (describing the variety of measures local governments
used to undermine Brown).
43 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
44Id.at
45

Id. at

229.
232.

Rethinking Subsidiarity

non-governmental organizations and fact-finding by special
rapporteurs can supply the international adjudicator with additional
information.
IV.

Conclusion

The principle of subsidiarity is a valuable aspect of the
international legal system. Nonetheless, the principle should not
be followed blindly under the assumption that subsidiarity always
serves the goals of international human rights law. Where it fails
to serve such purposes, subsidiarity can only be justified if it has
intrinsic normative value, and only where such normative value
outweighs its costs. Subsidiarity of international institutions with
regard to the content and enforcement of international human
rights law is unlikely to advance the cause of human dignity.
International adjudicatory bodies should therefore adopt the
primary role in defining the content of international human rights
treaties within their mandates and in designing remedies for
violations.
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